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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Internet has changed how public school students communicate 
and learn. Ninety-five percent of American teenagers between ages 
twelve and seventeen use the Internet—almost twenty percent higher 
than adults.1 Of those teens online, eighty percent use social media sites 
to communicate and interact.2 Millions of teenagers use the Internet to do 
their homework and to perform other school related functions.3 More and 
more students have Internet access while on campus, either through 
school computers in the classroom or through smart phones in their 
pockets. And seventy percent of teen Internet users go online daily, many 
of them several times per day.4 More importantly for this Comment, an 
increasing number5 of teenagers are enrolled in full- or part-time online 
schools.6 Attendance figures at traditional brick and mortar schools are 
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 1. Amanda Lenhart et al., Teens, Kindness and Cruelty on Social Network Sites, PEW 
RESEARCH CENTER: PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT, 15 (Nov. 9, 2011), 
http://pewInternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2011/PIP_Teens_Kindness_Cruelty_SNS_Report_No
v_2011_FINAL_110711.pdf. This is up from eighty-seven percent just eight years ago. 
 2. Id. 
 3. “Students use the Internet dozens of ways to help them in school. They see the Internet as a 
virtual textbook and reference library, a virtual tutor and study shortcut, a place to conduct virtual 
study groups, a virtual locker, backpack and notebook, and as a virtual guidance counselor when 
they are deciding about careers and colleges.” Press Release, Pew Research Center, Pew Internet & 
American Life Project, Online Teens Say Their Schools Don’t Use the Internet Well (Aug. 14, 
2002), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/Press-Releases/2002/Online-teens-say-their-schools-
dont-use-the-Internet-well.aspx. 
 4. Lenhart et al., supra note 1, at 16. 
 5. Nancy Mitchell, More Students Choicing Out of District, EDNEWS COLORADO (Jan. 18, 
2011), http://www.ednewscolorado.org/2011/01/18/12191-more-students-choicing-out-of-district. 
 6. ANTHONY G. PICCIANO & JEFF SEAMAN, K-12 ONLINE LEARNING: A SURVEY OF U.S. 
SCHOOL DISTRICT ADMINISTRATORS 7 (The Sloan Consortium, 2007). 
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changing as online learning opportunities grow in popularity and acces-
sibility across the country.7 One state even requires all of its high school 
students to take an online class before graduation.8 
Despite the overwhelming increase in students’ Internet use and the 
growing popularity of online public schools,9 the United States Supreme 
Court has never addressed how, or if, schools can discipline students for 
disruptive online speech without violating the students’ First Amend-
ment10 rights. What the Supreme Court has addressed is how school ad-
ministrators can constitutionally discipline students within traditional 
schools. In a landmark decision, Tinker v. Des Moines Independent 
Community School District, the Supreme Court announced the now fa-
mous principle that students do not “shed their constitutional rights to 
freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”11 Still, the 
Court continued, school administrators can discipline students when their 
speech “materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder.”12 
In a later case, the Court stated that free speech rights for students on 
campus are “not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in 
other settings.”13 
Historically, in order to determine if students have complete free 
speech rights equal to adults or limited rights, the important distinction 
was whether the speech occurred on campus or off campus. But “[t]he 
line between ‘on-campus’ and ‘off-campus’ is not as clear as it once 
was.”14 More and more high school students are electing to enroll in 
online high schools.15 In this new school structure, when students misbe-
have, the boundaries between constitutional protections for free speech 
and permissible school discipline are unclear. The Court has not ruled on 
                                                        
 7. In 2006, it was estimated that as many as 700,000 students were engaged in online courses, 
up from an estimated 40,000–50,000 in 2001. Id. at 3. 
 8. Vote Makes Idaho First State to Require High School Students to Take Two Online Learning 
Credits, 15 DISTANCE EDUCATION REPORT 23, 15 (2011). 
 9. Even though nothing prevents the application of the free speech cases to elementary schools, 
because of older students’ greater access to technology and online schools, this Comment will focus 
on the issues as applied to middle and high schools. 
 10. School districts are generally state actors. Thus, most free speech claims are brought under 
the Fourteenth Amendment. For simplicity, I will refer to free speech rights as existing under the 
First Amendment. 
 11. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). 
 12. Id. at 513 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)). 
 13. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986). 
 14. J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 951 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc) 
(Fisher, J., dissenting). 
 15. See PICCIANO & SEAMAN, supra note 6. 
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how schools should evaluate conduct relating to online learning.16 In 
fact, the Court has not said much about how schools should deal with 
online comments and speech by students at traditional brick and mortar 
schools. 
As students’ access to the Internet both in and out of the classroom 
grows, the differences between on campus and off campus often seem 
nonexistent. Students can text or chat online while they are sitting in the 
same classroom.17 Or they can communicate while one student is in the 
classroom and the other is off campus. Two students might be communi-
cating while off campus on Facebook18 or Twitter,19 but an on-campus 
student happens to read the messages and shares them among her class-
mates in the hallways. Are these examples of student speech on campus 
or off campus?20 
Adding more confusion, online school students rarely attend class 
in a traditional school facility.21 Online classes typically consist of an 
online forum, such as Blackboard or other school-sponsored websites, 
for teachers and students to interact. Also, many online schools have 
some limited in-person components, such as extracurricular clubs, field 
trips, athletics, and dances. Still, for many students, in-person interac-
tions are very limited, and their classroom instruction takes place purely 
online. Online students potentially could sit anywhere with Internet ac-
cess while they attend their classes.22 For these online students, off cam-
pus and on campus bleed into one another; the dividing line can be non-
existent. In the abstract, there is a compelling argument that students are 
only on campus for free speech purposes when they are on official school 
websites, but as this Comment discusses below, drawing the line there is 
                                                        
 16. The terms “online students,” “online schools,” and “online learning” are used in this Com-
ment to differentiate from students who receive their education in traditional brick and mortar 
schools. 
 17. Eighty-eight percent of teens who use social networking websites use them to send instant 
messages or chat through the site. Lenhart et al., supra note 1, at 22. 
 18. FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com (last visited Feb. 5, 2013). 
 19. TWITTER, http://twitter.com (last visited Feb. 5, 2013). 
 20. How all of these different scenarios should be treated are beyond the scope of this Com-
ment as they deal with students at traditional schools, but they do highlight some of the difficulties 
that arise from students’ behavior on the Internet that underlie the discussion. 
 21. “[C]yber charter schools often serve students on a fulltime basis and, as a result, these 
students do not have the ability to interact with their teachers and classmates before and after class or 
in the hallways of the school.” Michael Barbour & Cory Plough, Social Networking in 
Cyberschooling: Helping to Make Online Learning Less Isolating, TECHTRENDS, 56 (July/Aug. 
2009), http://edlab.tc.columbia.edu/files/Barbour2009.pdf. 
 22. Many online classes use online discussion boards to replicate traditional classroom discus-
sions, sometimes requiring students to contribute a set number of “posts” per semester. Nick Kre-
mer, How I Became a Convert to Online Learning, EDUCATIONAL LEADERSHIP, 63 (Feb. 2011), 
http://www.ascd.org/publications/educational-leadership/feb11/vol68/num05/How-I-Became-a-
Convert-to-Online-Learning.aspx. 
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ineffective and fails to account for ways students and schools use the 
Internet. Thus, the on-campus and off-campus categories that define 
much of the current student speech jurisprudence are in danger of be-
coming unworkable in the world of online learning. In this Comment, I 
suggest that in order to provide a workable standard that balances online 
students’ free speech rights with online schools’ obligations to maintain 
an appropriate learning environment for all students,23 the Supreme 
Court should apply Tinker, without its exceptions, to speech made by 
students at online schools. This solution, however, is not simple: the dif-
ficulty is how the standard should apply to achieve that appropriate bal-
ance. 
Part II discusses the four seminal cases in the area of free speech in 
public schools and the types of speech on which the Supreme Court has 
already ruled. In an effort to explain the challenges regarding online 
speech in general, Part III discusses the current confusion by lower 
courts in dealing with traditional students’ online speech and examines 
cases where lower courts have successfully evaluated speech under a 
Tinker analysis to determine whether it was substantially disruptive. Part 
IV suggests that the on-campus versus off-campus distinction is irrele-
vant for the world of online schools, and that the Supreme Court should 
apply Tinker to online learners because it strikes a balance between 
speech protections and the need for schools to maintain order and to pro-
tect the rights of the other students. Part V offers a brief conclusion. 
II. THE SEMINAL CASES ESTABLISHING LIMITS TO STUDENT SPEECH 
RIGHTS AT TRADITIONAL SCHOOLS: TINKER AND ITS THREE EXCEPTIONS 
A. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District24 
Students’ rights at school are not equivalent to their rights in public 
settings. Still, students do not “shed their constitutional rights to freedom 
of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”25 In Tinker, three stu-
dents were suspended for wearing black armbands to school in protest of 
the Vietnam War.26 The students’ parents filed a complaint and sought an 
injunction against the school officials and school board members, argu-
ing that the policy against armbands was unconstitutional.27 The Su-
preme Court held that the punishment was a violation of the students’ 
                                                        
 23. This Comment only addresses public school students because Free Speech and the other 
First Amendment rights are only applied against state actors, including public school officials, not 
private school employees or administrators. 
 24. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
 25. Id. at 506. 
 26. Id. at 504. 
 27. Id. 
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First Amendment right to free speech.28 Still, the Court did place some 
limits on student speech, as it said students could not “substantially inter-
fere with the work of the school or impinge on the rights of other stu-
dents.”29 In deciding that John Tinker’s constitutional rights were violat-
ed, the Court noted that his speech was passive and peaceful.30 There 
needed to be more than just the “discomfort and unpleasantness” of an 
ordinary controversial viewpoint in order for the school to step in and 
regulate the student’s speech.31 
Also, the Court made an important distinction by noting that the 
speech was permissible, in part, because it did not interfere with class-
room instruction time.32 Student speech that “materially disrupts class-
work or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of oth-
ers”33 was subject to punishment by the school administration. Schools 
must show that a student’s speech “materially and substantially inter-
fere[s] with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of 
the school.”34 The Court also mentioned that in this case the school could 
not prevent a display of speech before it happened because there were 
not “any facts which might reasonably have led school authorities to 
forecast substantial disruption of or material interference with school 
activities.”35 A second prong of the justification, highlighted in later cas-
es, was that schools can discipline students for speech that “colli[des] 
with the rights of other students to be secure and to be let alone.”36 Pro-
tecting the rights of the other students to receive an education without 
substantial disruption provides strong justification for applying Tinker to 
students’ speech at online schools.37 
                                                        
 28. Id. at 514. 
 29. Id. at 512–13. 
 30. Id. at 508. 
 31. Id. at 509. 
 32. Classroom instruction time refers to exactly that—time that students spend in the classroom 
learning—as opposed to time after school, during lunch or passing periods, or school events. Still, 
the Court made clear that students’ speech rights are not limited to time spent in the classroom: 
The principal use to which the schools are dedicated is to accommodate students during 
prescribed hours for the purpose of certain types of activities. Among those activities is 
personal intercommunication among the students. This is not only an inevitable part of 
the process of attending school; it is also an important part of the educational process. A 
student’s rights, therefore, do not embrace merely the classroom hours. When he is in the 
cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on the campus during the authorized hours, he may 
express his opinions, even on controversial subjects. . . . 
Id. at 512–13. 
 33. Id. at 513. 
 34. Id. at 505. 
 35. Id. at 514. 
 36. Id. at 505. 
 37. See infra Part IV.C, discussing the need for schools to be able to protect other students. 
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B. Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser38 
Even though Tinker required schools to prove a material or substan-
tial disruption, some student speech, by its very nature, can be regulated 
in traditional schools in order to maintain discipline and protect the rights 
of other students to receive an education. Out of this need, the Court cre-
ated the first of three exceptions to Tinker.39 In Fraser, the Court ruled in 
favor of a school district that had disciplined a student, Matthew Fraser, 
for giving a vulgar campaign speech that was laden with sexual innuen-
does during a school assembly.40 The speech was given in support of his 
friend who was running for a student government position at the 
school.41 After the speech, the school suspended Fraser for three days 
and took his name off of a list of potential graduation speakers.42 After 
exhausting his administrative appeals within the school district, Fraser 
sued, claiming a First Amendment violation and sought both an injunc-
tion against the school and monetary damages.43 
In part due to the offensive and graphic language used, the Court 
held that the school did not violate Fraser’s First Amendment rights, and 
the punishment was upheld, even though the school did not show a mate-
rial or substantial disruption, as was required under Tinker.44 The Court 
noted again that public school students’ constitutional rights are not 
equal to that of adults in other settings.45 Even more specifically, the 
Court highlighted the fact that public schools play a unique and im-
portant role in American society, and their ability to perform that im-
                                                        
 38. 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
 39. In many ways, Fraser, Kuhlmeier, and Morse can be seen as creating exceptions to Tink-
er’s “material and substantial disruption” standard, as under those decisions there is no requirement 
that the speech create such a disruption. Schools can regulate those types of speech because of the 
very nature and content of the speech, not because of the disruption it causes. See generally Morse v. 
Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988); Fraser, 
478 U.S. 675. 
 40. Matthew Fraser gave the following speech, which became the basis for his suspension: 
I know a man who is firm—he’s firm in his pants, he’s firm in his shirt, his character is 
firm—but most . . . of all, his belief in you, the students of Bethel, is firm. Jeff Kuhlman 
is a man who takes his point and pounds it in. If necessary, he’ll take an issue and nail it 
to the wall. He doesn’t attack things in spurts—he drives hard, pushing and pushing until 
finally—he succeeds. Jeff is a man who will go to the very end—even the climax, for 
each and every one of you. So vote for Jeff for A.S.B. vice-president—he’ll never come 
between you and the best our high school can be. 
Fraser, 478 U.S. at 687 (Brennan, J., concurring) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 679. 
 44. Id. at 686. 
 45. Id. at 682 (discussing the student constitutional rights based on the search and seizure con-
text as found in New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985)). 
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portant function at times merits a restriction of First Amendment rights.46 
The speech was clearly on campus, as it occurred during the school day, 
in the school gym, at a school-sponsored assembly.47 Therefore, the on-
campus speech rules applied.48 In distinguishing Tinker, the Court deter-
mined that Fraser’s speech “undermine[d] the school’s basic educational 
mission,”49 and that schools have a duty to socialize students in civic de-
corum with respect to the values of creativity, propriety, and sensibilities 
of others.50 Especially because younger students were present and the 
audience was a captive one sitting in an assembly, the lewd and indecent 
speech clearly interfered with that mission.51 
A big lesson from Fraser is that schools are training grounds for 
students to become public citizens, and the vulgar language from the 
speech would not be tolerated in the real world.52 The Court stated 
“[e]ven the most heated political discourse in a democratic society re-
quires consideration for the personal sensibilities of the other participants 
and audiences.”53 
C. Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier54 
In Kuhlmeier, the Court carved out another exception to Tinker, and 
ruled in favor of a school that disciplined student speech without proving 
a substantial disruption.55 When concerns about speech are reasonably 
related to pedagogical concerns, educators may exercise editorial control 
over school-sponsored speech without violating the First Amendment.56 
The student speech at issue was written for a high school newspaper 
class at the school.57 The newspaper’s student-journalists wrote and 
planned to publish articles about teen pregnancy, teen sexual activity, 
                                                        
 46. Id. at 682. 
 47. Id. at 683. 
 48. See id. 
 49. Id. at 685. 
 50. Id. at 681–82 (comparing the school policy to speech restrictions adopted by the United 
States House of Representatives and Senate). 
 51. Id. at 683–84. 
 52. This is not to suggest that an adult who gave the same speech in a public venue would face 
any sort of legal consequences. The focus was on enabling schools to teach and model the “appro-
priate form of civil discourse and political expression,” and “the shared values of a civilized social 
order.” Id. at 683. 
 53. Id. at 681. 
 54. 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
 55. Id. at 265. 
 56. Id. at 271. 
 57. Id. at 262. 
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local divorce rates, and birth control use by students.58 The articles were 
pulled from the issue by the school principal before publication.59 
In ruling in favor of the school and principal, the Court held that a 
school need not tolerate speech that is inconsistent with its educational 
mission, even though the speech would be permitted outside of the 
school setting.60 In distinguishing the case from Tinker, the Court said, 
“The question whether the First Amendment requires a school to tolerate 
particular student speech—the question we addressed in Tinker—is dif-
ferent from the question whether the First Amendment requires a school 
affirmatively to promote particular student speech.”61 In cases where 
schools are asked to affirmatively promote particular student speech, 
schools have the ability to exercise editorial control over the speech “so 
long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical 
concerns.”62 Indeed, the chance that the public would misinterpret the 
speech as being promoted by the school provided additional justification 
for the Court.63 Thus, a new category of student speech regulation was 
established: speech that could be seen as school sponsored where disci-
pline relates to the school’s pedagogical mission.64 And again, like in 
Fraser, the Court did not require a showing of a material and substantial 
disruption, relying instead on the “substantially interfere with [its] work . 
. . or impinge upon the rights of other students” justification from Tink-
er.65 
D. Morse v. Frederick66 
Schools can also regulate speech reasonably viewed as promoting 
illegal drug use.67 In Morse, a student was suspended for displaying a 
banner that read, “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” at an off-campus but school-
approved and supervised event.68 The students gathered off campus to 
watch the Olympic torch run past.69 Prior to the event beginning, the 
school explicitly established that school rules would be applied to stu-
dents at the event. Still, Joseph Frederick refused to take down the ban-
ner, and he was suspended for ten days. In creating its third exception to 
                                                        
 58. Id. at 263. 
 59. Id. at 264. 
 60. Id. at 266. 
 61. Id. at 270–71. 
 62. Id. at 273. 
 63. Id. at 271. 
 64. Id. at 273. 
 65. Id. at 271. 
 66. 551 U.S. 393 (2007). 
 67. Id. at 403. 
 68. Id. at 397. 
 69. Id. 
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Tinker, the Court determined that the punishment was not an infringe-
ment on Frederick’s First Amendment rights because the banner was 
“reasonably regarded as promoting illegal drug use,” and the school 
could regulate such speech in order to protect those under its care from 
speech that encourages drug use.70 
More important for this Comment than the topic of drug use, the 
Court in Morse chose not to weigh in on how to treat the students’ off-
campus speech.71 Because the event was school sponsored, it took place 
during normal school hours, and the school made it clear that school 
rules would apply to students at the torch-relay viewing event, the Court 
used the traditional student speech distinction of on campus and off cam-
pus. Instead of dealing with the issue of off-campus speech, the Court 
simply determined that the speech was on campus and created another 
exception to Tinker.72 
E. A Brief Summary of the Current Law 
The four Supreme Court student speech cases set some fairly clear 
boundaries for regulating on-campus student speech at traditional 
schools. In order for school administrators to regulate student speech, it 
must either “materially and substantially interfere” or be reasonably fore-
seeable to materially and substantially interfere with the educational mis-
sion of the school;73 involve lewd and indecent speech;74 risk being seen 
as sponsored by the school and be reasonably related to the school’s ped-
agogical concerns;75 or be reasonably viewed as promoting illegal drug 
use.76 The Supreme Court has not yet ruled on an Internet or off-campus 
speech case, and there is some confusion and inconsistency among lower 
courts in determining when to apply these tests. Still, when the lower 
courts do apply a Tinker analysis, they do so successfully, as will be seen 
below. 
                                                        
 70. The Court admitted that the message on the banner was “cryptic,” but concluded that the 
interpretation by the principal that it was promoting drug use was “plainly a reasonable one.” Id. at 
401. 
 71. Id. at 400–01. 
 72. Id. at 401. (“Under these circumstances, we agree with the superintendent that Frederick 
cannot ‘stand in the midst of his fellow students, during school hours, at a school-sanctioned activity 
and claim he is not at school.’”) (Internal citation omitted). 
 73. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
 74. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
 75. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
 76. Morse, 551 U.S. 393. However, at least one author suggests that trial courts have begun to 
expand the holding in Morse to other areas including violence and homophobic expression, a topic 
beyond the scope of this Comment. Clay Calvert, Misuse and Abuse of Morse v. Frederick by Lower 
Courts: Stretching the High Court’s Ruling Too Far to Censor Student Expression, 32 SEATTLE U. 
L. REV. 1, 5 (2008). 
1512 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 36:1503 
III. TINKER IS A WORKABLE STANDARD FOR COURTS 
A. The Current Struggle with Evaluating Online Speech 
At first blush, the simplicity of the on-campus or off-campus ap-
proach is appealing—just determine the location of the speech and then 
apply the speech laws for that location.77 Historically, this was an easy 
distinction to make, as the location of speech was physically limited to 
where the person was speaking. But where is the Internet?78 And, more 
importantly here, where is the classroom for online students? Practically 
speaking, limiting speech regulation to school-sponsored websites would 
leave administrators unable to protect students’ rights to receive an edu-
cation free from substantial disruption, a foundational principle from 
Tinker. In order to protect the learning environment, online schools need 
to have the ability to protect students from some comments made on non-
school-sponsored websites. The key, of course, is finding the right bal-
ance between allowing schools to maintain their educational environment 
and protecting students’ free speech rights. The on or off-campus distinc-
tion, a threshold issue for applying Tinker and its three exceptions, 
quickly becomes unworkable and ineffective for determining boundaries 
for online students’ speech.79 
Even for traditional students, the circuit courts are split as to what 
to do with speech made online. The Supreme Court’s four school speech 
cases offer little guidance for schools and courts to follow in determining 
the boundaries of regulating online speech. In the Court’s four school 
speech cases, all of the speech was either at school or at a school-
sponsored event.80 Thus, many courts believe the first step in evaluating 
the speech is to determine whether or not the speech occurred on cam-
pus. Then, the courts apply Tinker’s material and substantial disruption 
test or its three exceptions. Some courts require a “nexus” between the 
speech and the school or a “reasonable foreseeability” that the speech 
                                                        
 77. The rules from Tinker, Fraser, Kuhlmeier, and Morse apply to on-campus speech; tradi-
tional free speech law (including libel, slander, true threats) applies to off-campus speech. See supra 
Part II. 
 78. See Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 851 (1997) (“[C]yberspace—located 
in no particular geographical location but available to anyone, anywhere in the world, with access to 
the Internet.”). 
 79. “[Courts have] failed to establish clear guidance as to how far the First Amendment ex-
tends in protecting off campus student speech. . . . Many courts have extended Tinker to apply to off 
campus speech, while others have refused to recognize the school’s disciplinary authority simply 
because of the speech’s off campus origin.” William Bird, Constitutional Law—True Threat Doc-
trine and Public School Speech—An Expansive View of a School’s Authority to Discipline Allegedly 
Threatening Student Speech Arising Off-campus: Doe v. Pulaski County Special School District, 26 
U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 111, 128 (2003). 
 80. See supra Part II. 
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would reach the campus, as will be discussed below.81 But even for tradi-
tional students, some courts have begun to apply Tinker’s material and 
substantial disruption test without first inquiring into the physical loca-
tion of the speech.82 This Comment contends that Tinker is the appropri-
ate standard for evaluating speech by students at online schools. 
One author comments that courts have been more willing to apply 
Tinker to off-campus speech than to apply Fraser.83 As that author notes, 
this may be because “Tinker requires a showing that the expression dis-
rupted or could reasonably be expected to disrupt school activities; Fra-
ser does not.”84 Tinker’s substantial disruption, or reasonable foreseeabil-
ity of such a disruption, requirement provides an important safeguard 
against infringement on students’ rights. Even under the wider reaching 
reasonable foreseeability standard, the disruption must be a substantial 
one. Similar to the Vietnam War protests in Tinker, which would certain-
ly have been likely to cause a disruption, mere discomfort or annoyance 
is not enough. The school would have to explain why the disruption to 
the learning environment is likely and how it would be substantial. 
The link to the school provides another important justification for 
applying Tinker to online students’ speech.85 Linking speech regulation 
to the impact of the learning environment protects students who say in-
appropriate, juvenile, or even idiotic things online that do not affect other 
students’ ability to learn. The nexus also allows schools to perform their 
duties to regulate speech in those instances when it does interfere with 
other students’ learning. 
The circuits are split on whether to apply Tinker to off-campus 
speech.86 But the courts that do apply a Tinker analysis are able to ade-
quately determine whether a substantial disruption has occurred.87 In two 
recent Third Circuit en banc opinions, argued and decided on the same 
day, the circuit did not definitively decide if it would apply Tinker to off-
campus speech.88 In one case, the concurrence argued that it should not 
                                                        
 81. Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 50 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 82. Mary-Rose Papandrea, Student Speech Rights in the Digital Age, 60 FLA. L. REV. 1027, 
1064 (2008) (referring to Killion v. Franklin Reg’l Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d 446 (W.D. Pa. 2011)). 
 83. Id. at 1069–70. 
 84. Id. at 1070. 
 85. See infra Part IV. 
 86. Compare Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 615, 620 (5th Cir. 2004) 
(declining to apply Tinker to off-campus speech), with Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of Weedsport 
Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir. 2007) (applying Tinker to off-campus speech). 
 87. See infra Part III.B and III.C. 
 88. “We need not now define the precise parameters of when the arm of authority can reach 
beyond the schoolhouse gate because, as we noted earlier, the district court found that Justin’s con-
duct did not disrupt the school, and the District does not appeal that finding.” Layshock v. Hermitage 
Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 219 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc); see also J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain 
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be applied.89 But in the other case, the concurrence noted that Tinker 
“can be applicable to off-campus speech. . . . [And] no ruling coming out 
today is to the contrary.”90 
Because neither school was able to prove a substantial disruption, 
the court declined to resolve whether Tinker applies to off-campus 
speech.91 Even if Tinker did apply to off-campus speech, the court rea-
soned, the schools would not be able to discipline the students in those 
cases.92 Still, the court was able to successfully use the test and decide 
that a substantial disruption did not occur.93 
Even though the Third Circuit does not explicitly apply Tinker to 
off-campus speech, it did successfully analyze the facts using a Tinker 
“substantial disruption” analysis. Because these cases demonstrate the 
workability of the Tinker standard in the courts, the two Third Circuit 
opinions, as well as an opinion by the Second Circuit, will now be exam-
ined in greater detail. 
B. The Third Circuit Cases: Layshock v. Hermitage School District94 and 
J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain School District95 
In Layshock, one of the Third Circuit en banc decisions mentioned 
above, the student created a fake Internet profile of his school principal 
while he was at his grandmother’s house during nonschool hours.96 The 
profile contained some disrespectful language.97 The student subsequent-
                                                                                                                            
Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 926 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc) (“[W]e will assume, without deciding, that 
Tinker applies to J.S.’s [off-campus] speech in this case.”). 
 89. “I write separately to address a question that the majority opinion expressly leaves open: 
whether Tinker applies to off-campus speech in the first place. I would hold that it does not. . . .” 
Blue Mountain, 650 F.3d at 926 (Smith, J., concurring). 
 90. Layshock, 650 F.3d at 220 (Jordan, J., concurring). 
 91. See supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
 92. Blue Mountain, 650 F.3d 915; Layshock, 650 F.3d 205. In some ways, the Third Circuit 
substitutes the substantial disruption test for the on-campus versus off-campus test as the threshold 
question. In other words, the initial inquiry is about whether there was a substantial disruption, and 
not about the location of the speech. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Layshock, 650 F.3d 205. 
 95. Blue Mountain, 650 F.3d 915. 
 96. Layshock, 650 F.3d at 207. 
 97. The student created a fake profile of his high school principal on MySpace targeting the 
principal based on his large size, using the word “big” in many of his answers: 
For example, [the student] answered ‘tell me about yourself’ questions as follows: 
Birthday: too drunk to remember 
Are you a health freak: big steroid freak 
In the past month have you smoked: big blunt 
In the past month have you been on pills: big pills 
In the past month have you gone Skinny Dipping: big lake, not big dick 
Id. at 208. 
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ly accessed the profile on a school computer during the school day and 
showed it to other students in his class.98 “[T]he profile ‘spread like wild-
fire’ and soon reached most, if not all, of [the] student body.”99 Some 
other students accessed the profile from school computers as well.100 The 
student soon went unprompted into the principal’s office and apolo-
gized.101 After learning of the profile, the school suspended the student 
for ten days.102 Outside of a few students looking at the profile in a com-
puter lab class, the district court found that the school district did “not 
establish a sufficient nexus between [the student’s] speech and a substan-
tial disruption of the school environment.”103 
In Blue Mountain, the other en banc decision, a student also created 
a fake Internet profile from her home computer of the school principal.104 
The profile included vulgar language and profanity and insinuated that 
the principal was a sex addict and pedophile.105 The student made the 
profile “private” and allowed twenty-two other students to view the pro-
file through their MySpace profiles.106 The only version of the profile 
that was physically brought to campus was by a different student after 
the principal asked him to bring it.107 Again, because there was no sub-
stantial disruption, the court held that the school violated the author’s 
First Amendment rights regulating the speech.108 The district argued that 
it had authority to punish the student based on the reasonable foreseeabil-
ity of the profile creating a substantial disruption in the school.109 How-
                                                        
 98. Id. at 209. 
 99. Id. at 208. 
 100. Id. at 209. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 210. 
 103. Id. at 216, 219. The school did not appeal the district court’s holding on the disruption 
issue. 
 104. The disciplined student included the following obscene language in the relevant “About 
Me” section of the principal’s fake profile page: “HELLO CHILDREN[.] yes. it’s your oh so won-
derful, hairy, expressionless, sex addict, fagass, put on this world with a small dick PRINCIPAL[.] I 
have come to myspace so i can pervert the minds of other principal’s [sic] to be just like me.” J.S. ex 
rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 921 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc) (grammar and 
spelling as it appears in the court opinion). 
 105. Id. at 921. Although the use of sexual and vulgar language has similarities to the type of 
speech that can be regulated under Fraser’s lewdness standard, Fraser does not appear to apply to 
off-campus speech. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 394 (2007) (discussing Fraser, the major-
ity noted that “[h]ad Fraser delivered the same speech in a public forum outside the school context, it 
would have been protected”). 
 106. Blue Mountain, 650 F.3d at 921. 
 107. Id. 
 108. “There was no dispute that J.S.’s speech did not cause a substantial disruption in the 
school. The School District conceded this point at oral argument . . . .” Id. at 928. 
 109. Id. Under Tinker, a school can regulate speech based on “facts which might reasonably 
have led school authorities to forecast substantial disruption of or material interference with school 
activities.” Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969). 
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ever, because other students were already aware of the profile and their 
reactions were quite limited,110 the court held that it was not reasonably 
foreseeable at the time of discipline that the profile would create a sub-
stantial disruption at the school.111 Therefore, the school violated the stu-
dent’s First Amendment rights by suspending her.112 The case also high-
lights the high standard schools must meet in order to prove a substantial 
disruption is reasonably foreseeable. 
C. The Second Circuit Case: Wisniewski v. Board of Education of 
Weedsport Central School District113 
Unlike the Third Circuit, the Second Circuit explicitly applies Tink-
er to off-campus speech. The Second Circuit in Wisniewski v. Board of 
Education of Weedsport Central School District applied Tinker and held 
that it was reasonably foreseeable that a graphic image sent over an in-
stant messenger would materially and substantially disrupt the work of 
the school.114 In Wisniewski, a student’s instant messenger icon displayed 
a picture of a gun firing a bullet at a man’s head.115 The man was identi-
fied in a caption below as his English teacher.116 When the student sent 
messages to fifteen of his friends, his instant messenger icon was dis-
played on the receiving students’ computers.117 It was not sent to any 
teachers or school officials.118 The only time the image was physically on 
campus was after one of the student’s classmates brought it in and gave a 
copy of it to a teacher.119 After a hearing held before a designated hearing 
officer, the student was suspended.120 The court determined that it was 
reasonably foreseeable that it would create a risk of substantial disruption 
at school, in part because of the “threatening content of the icon and the 
extensive distribution of it, which encompassed 15 recipients,” and his 
punishment was upheld.121 
                                                        
 110. “[B]eyond some general rumblings, a few minutes of talking in class, and some officials 
rearranging their schedules to assist [the principal] in dealing with the profile, no disruptions oc-
curred.” Blue Mountain, 650 F.3d at 929. 
 111. Id. at 930. 
 112. Id. at 931. 
 113. 494 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 114. Id. at 38–39. 
 115. Id. at 35–36. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 36. 
 119. Id. 
 120. The hearing officer found that the act “disrupted school operations by requiring the spe-
cial attention [of] school officials, replacement of the threatened teacher, and interviewing pupils 
during class time.” Id. 
 121. Id. at 39–40. 
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D. Concluding Thoughts About the Workability of Tinker 
Layshock, Blue Mountain, and Wisniewski show that the courts are 
able to distinguish between speech that substantially disrupts, or has a 
reasonable foreseeability to cause a substantial disruption at school, and 
speech that does not. Even though those cases shared similar facts 
(online speech made by students off campus that targeted school offi-
cials), the courts only upheld the punishment for the student whose 
speech was more threatening, and therefore was more likely to cause a 
substantial disruption to the learning environment. Speech that was mere-
ly uncomfortable and inappropriate, but lacked the substantially disrup-
tive quality, was protected. Tinker’s workability makes it an attractive 
starting point for evaluating student speech in the online school context. 
IV. TINKER SHOULD APPLY TO ONLINE LEARNERS 
Based on the school’s duty to protect the learning environment for 
other students and the impracticalities of limiting a school’s reach to of-
ficial school websites only, this Comment proposes applying an old test, 
Tinker, to the new speech issues in online schools. For a number of rea-
sons, applying Tinker, without its exceptions, is an appropriate and 
workable standard for evaluating student speech at online schools. In-
stead of the on or off-campus approach used in traditional schools, the 
test for online students’ speech should simply be whether or not there 
was a material or substantial disruption, or the reasonable foreseeability 
of a substantial disruption, to the learning environment.122 This solution 
achieves a proper balance by requiring documentation about the nature of 
the speech and the substantial effect it has, or is reasonably foreseeable 
to have, on the learning environment for other students. Due to the lim-
ited in-person contacts of online learning, speech in general will be less 
likely to impact other students, resulting in more free speech protections 
for online students than traditional students. Comments that may have a 
major impact at a traditional school might go unnoticed or be ignored at 
online schools without the in-person discussions that often fuel such dis-
ruptions. Lower courts have shown an ability to apply Tinker appropri-
ately, and fears of school overreach are unlikely to be realized in prac-
tice. 
                                                        
 122. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505 (1969). 
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A. Schools Need Tools to Protect the Learning Environment for Other 
Students 
Critics of both current law and of expanding the reach of school 
administrators point at the dangers of silencing student speech.123 But 
this perspective ignores the importance of schools in our society and 
their duty to maintain order and discipline for the benefit of the other 
students.124 As one scholar notes, “[t]here is little question that students’ 
constitutional rights at school must be restricted for schools to properly 
function.”125 
The Tinker Court’s concern with the rights of the other students at 
the school to receive an education is foundational.126 In Tinker, the con-
cern about the disruption was in order to protect the rights of other stu-
dents at the school.127 Indeed, all students’ rights are part of the free 
speech discussion. Tinker’s classmates had every right to go to school 
and receive their education without others infringing on that right. Be-
cause their right was not interfered with, the school could not regulate 
Tinker’s speech. In Fraser, the Court mentioned the ages of the younger 
students present at the assembly several times, signifying its concern 
with protecting students.128 The question is not simply whether the stu-
dent speaker’s rights are being infringed; rather, the legitimate and rec-
ognized rights of the other students to receive an education are also in 
play.129 Student A’s offensive and vulgar speech is regulated because of 
its substantial impact on or potential to substantially impact Student B’s 
right to receive an education. 
More specifically than their duty to protect other students’ right to 
receive an education, schools have a duty to protect students from bully-
ing. Schools need tools to regulate speech because they can be held liable 
when they fail to address certain types of speech, especially 
                                                        
 123. This is often referred to as the “chilling” of free speech. The chilling effect is problematic 
because it “gives rise to self-censorship and diminish[es] [] the marketplace of ideas.” Aaron H. 
Caplan, Public School Discipline for Creating Uncensored Anonymous Internet Forums, 39 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 93, 148 (2003); see also David L. Hudson, Censorship of Student Internet 
Speech: The Effect of Diminishing Student Rights, Fear of the Internet and Columbine, 200 M.S.U.-
D.C.L. 199, 221 (2000); Clay Calvert, Off-Campus Speech, On-Campus Punishment: Censorship of 
the Emerging Internet Underground, 7 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 234, 275 (2001). 
 124. See, e.g., Todd D. Erb, A Case for Strengthening School District Jurisdiction to Punish 
Off-Campus Incidents of Cyberbullying, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 257 (2008). 
 125. Lee Goldman, Student Speech and the First Amendment: A Comprehensive Approach, 63 
FLA. L. REV. 395, 418 (2011) (referencing the special characteristics of the school environment and 
the need for some administrative control). 
 126. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
 127. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513. 
 128. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683–84 (1986). 
 129. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513 (rights of others prong for supporting discipline at schools). 
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cyberbullying.130 After a recent flurry of legislation, forty-six states cur-
rently have anti-bullying laws, many of which require schools to take 
certain steps to protect students.131 Cyberbullying, like traditional bully-
ing, has consequences that reach beyond the location of the speech and 
into the school environment.132 Recent stories about suicides linked to 
bullying show the seriousness of it133 and the importance of protecting 
students.134 As a result, schools need greater tools to protect students 
from bullying.135 
Although cyberbullying likely has its greatest impact when it is 
combined with in-person bullying at a brick and mortar school,136 it still 
remains a real possibility for online schools, especially at those that offer 
in-person activities or where the students have stronger in-person rela-
tionships. By applying the Tinker standard, the online school would be 
able to intervene when the bullying or harassing speech affects the 
                                                        
 130. For example, in the State of Washington, schools may be found liable if the school envi-
ronment has been altered for a victim of bullying, if staff knew or should have known, and they 
failed to act or acted with deliberate indifference. School Safety Center, State of Washington, Office 
of Superintendent of Public Instruction, http://www.k12.wa.us/safetycenter/default.aspx (last visited 
Feb. 5, 2013). 
 131. Analysis of State Bullying Laws and Policies, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OFFICE OF PLANNING, 
EVALUATION AND POLICY DEV., POLICY AND PROGRAM STUDIES SERV., 3 (2011), 
http://www2.ed.gov/rschstat/eval/bullying/state-bullying-laws/state-bullying-laws.pdf; see also 
Abbott Koloff, States Push for Cyberbully Controls, USA TODAY, Feb. 7, 2008, available at 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2008-02-06-cyberbullying_N.htm. 
 132. Cyberbullying is one of the many justifications for allowing some school regulation over 
Internet speech: 
When students use off-campus Internet speech to harass the school community, limiting 
authority to the geographical status of speech becomes harder to justify, as there is a bet-
ter chance that Internet speech will impact the school community. Furthermore, a bright-
line rule that removes all school authority over speech merely because of its off-campus 
status ignores the relationship between the speaker and the target of the speech. 
Renee L. Servance, Cyberbullying, Cyber-Harassment, and the Conflict Between Schools and the 
First Amendment, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 1213, 1235 (2003). 
 133. In some ways cyberbullying creates even more problems, as “bullying online has a dis-
proportionate appeal for girls who can use technology to substitute for physicality.” Kathleen Conn, 
Cyberbullying and Other Student Technology Misuses in K-12 American Schools: The Legal 
Landmines, 16 WIDENER L. REV. 89, 91 n.17 (2010). 
 134. See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 131, at 3. 
 135. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986). In discussing the differ-
ences between bullying in adult speech and student speech, one commentator writes: 
Contemporary courts and public-interest groups defend this [bullying] speech under the 
theory that any harm it causes is outweighed by the greater danger of suppressing free 
expression. While this view of the First Amendment is perhaps an appropriate standard 
for adults in a democratic society, it is not appropriate for schoolchildren. 
Servance, supra note 132, at 1214.  
 136. “This constant harassment made possible by a website compounds the invasion of privacy 
and the impact of bullying. Inevitably, the resulting emotional wreckage arrives at the schoolhouse 
gate, leaving school administrators and teachers to deal with the fallout.” Servance, supra note 132, 
at 1219. 
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school environment for the student, but it would not overreach and inter-
fere with incidents that occur without the possibility of substantially im-
pacting the school environment for other students.137 
B. The On-Campus Versus Off-Campus Distinction is Unworkable in 
Practice for Online Schools 
The on-campus versus off-campus distinction is unworkable for 
students who go to school online—what should be considered as their 
campus? If the academic aspect of school is conducted on an official 
school website, but the social aspect of it is done over nonschool web-
sites, where should the line be drawn? Indeed, social networking use is 
even encouraged in many online schools, through the use of “private”138 
Facebook groups or Gmail discussion threads, as a way to replicate the 
social interactions at traditional schools.139 
A hypothetical may be helpful to demonstrate how this would work 
in practice. It is easy to picture students that go to school online sitting in 
their bedrooms or living rooms while attending class or completing an 
assignment, and many online schools provide the students with comput-
ers. On a typical day, students would sign in to their school webpage and 
communicate with other students and their teachers. If a student has mul-
tiple windows open on his computer screen—one to the school webpage 
and one to Facebook, Twitter, or Gmail140—he could, in theory, be both 
on campus and off campus at the same time. 
The argument that only comments posted on school-sponsored 
websites should be subject to review by school administrators fails to 
account for the practical limitations of such a test and the duties schools 
have to protect other students’ right to learn. Admittedly, there are legit-
imate concerns in allowing schools to potentially regulate all student 
speech made online. Practically speaking, though, schools will not be 
able to carry out their duties if they are limited to only speech posted on 
school-sponsored websites. Even the most juvenile of students would 
figure out how to avoid punishment by simply moving their harassing or 
bullying comments to Facebook, text message, or other nonschool web-
sites and therefore beyond the reach of the school. 
                                                        
 137. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
 138. A “private” Facebook group means a group with limited access. FACEBOOK, 
www.facebook.com/help/privacy (last visited Feb. 5, 2013). 
 139. “Essentially, the social network has been the public space that has allowed the students a 
sphere for their social development, similar to the kind of public space they would have experienced 
in the traditional school environment (often outside of the formal classroom).” Barbour & Plough, 
supra note 21, at 59. 
 140. GMAIL, http://mail.google.com (last visited Feb. 5, 2013). 
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Logically, it is easy to draw a line between the school website and 
the nonschool website, but this line is more of a distinction without a 
difference. Imagine a situation where some students are harassing a fel-
low student in a Facebook group about comments he offered in the class 
discussion on the school website. These comments certainly have the 
potential to substantially disrupt the learning environment if other stu-
dents learn about the harassment and begin to withdraw from class par-
ticipation. Or similarly, what if a student made disparaging, vulgar, or 
threatening comments over instant messaging with his classmates in one 
window while “in-class” on the school website in another? If speech on 
non-school-sponsored websites is completely off limits to school admin-
istrators, there would be no remedy for this situation, and the school 
would be unable to fulfill its duty to protect the impacted students. If 
those comments were made between students at a traditional school, they 
would certainly be subject to discipline.141 Online speech passed between 
students that is serious enough to substantially disrupt the learning envi-
ronment is analogous to other students repeating a statement over and 
over in a traditional classroom. In order for the online student’s speech to 
rise to the substantially disruptive level, it likely would need to be widely 
shared among the students. Or, if a student did make comments on 
school-sponsored websites, it would be much more likely to be noticed 
by other students and impact the school environment. The only signifi-
cant distinction from traditional speech is the medium over which the 
comments were made—a distinction that demonstrates the futility of the 
current on-campus versus off-campus model. 
Technology improvements have also seriously changed the method 
and intensity of comments directed at teachers and students such that the 
comparison to previous generations is not particularly applicable.142 The 
pervasiveness and speed of technology fundamentally changes the im-
pact of speech.143 A vulgar remark or joke about a teacher or another stu-
dent spoken at a private party can quickly be recorded and transmitted 
beyond the walls that historically would have contained it.144 Modern 
student speech has a significantly different character than past genera-
tions’ speech, one that is more rapidly disseminated and instantaneously 
accessed by students, even when not physically together on campus. Giv-
ing online schools the ability to regulate speech that substantially dis-
                                                        
 141. See supra Part II. 
 142. Servance, supra note 132, at 1214 (discussing the changes in the content and the manner 
of student speech since Tinker). 
 143. See supra notes 1–4 and accompanying text. 
 144. The example is based on a hypothetical posed in J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. 
Dist., 650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc). There, the private party hypothetical was used to 
demonstrate why Fraser should not apply to off-campus speech. 
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rupts the school environment recognizes that off-campus comments be-
tween classmates, which historically would have been innocuous, can 
have a much greater impact on the school environment simply because of 
the technology by which it is transmitted. But only if the speech has a 
substantial impact on the school environment, or is reasonably foreseea-
ble to have such an impact, would the online school be able to regulate 
it.145 
C. Tinker is an Appropriate Standard for Online Schools 
The Supreme Court’s silence on the on-campus versus off-campus 
distinction, combined with the emerging popularity of online learning for 
high school students, leaves school administrators, students, and lower 
courts uncertain about how to treat student speech now that the high 
school model is changing to include more online opportunities. Given 
that schools have a duty to protect students and that limiting schools to 
speech made on official school websites is ineffective, the question be-
comes what test should be applied to online students’ speech. Tinker’s 
requirement of a connection to the learning environment mitigates some 
of the concerns that arise from allowing schools to regulate off-campus 
speech. In many ways, online speech by online students has an even 
closer nexus to being “on-campus” speech than similar speech by tradi-
tional students because the “campus” itself is online. 
In addition to the utility of Tinker, and courts’ ability to effectively 
apply it, as described in Part III, applying Tinker without its exceptions 
to online students strikes a balance between regulation and protection of 
student speech rights. The Fraser, Kuhlmeier, and Morse exceptions to 
Tinker do not require a showing of a substantial disruption, or reasonable 
foreseeability of such a disruption, in order to regulate student speech.146 
In order to avoid censorship and overreaching by schools,147 only the 
Tinker standard should be applied to online schools. Therefore, even of-
fensive or unpleasant speech with little to no connection to the learning 
environment would remain protected. 
                                                        
 145. In a similar context—employment harassment—one scholar notes that the location of the 
speech is largely irrelevant for determining the protection it receives. He writes that in the work-
place, Internet speech can “create a ‘hostile, abusive, or offensive work environment’. . . based on 
the person’s race, religion, sex, national origin, disability, age, veteran status [or other attributes]” 
and that “the medium by and large does not and should not affect the protection—or lack of protec-
tion—given to the content.” Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Cyberspace, Harassment Law, and 
the Clinton Administration, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 299, 301–02 (2000). 
 146. See supra Part II, discussing the seminal cases. 
 147. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
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Tinker helps to ensure that only the speech that truly could impact 
the school environment could be regulated.148 Requiring online schools 
to document and provide evidence of the disruption on the school envi-
ronment, or reasonable foreseeability of such a disruption, would ensure 
that the speech had a sufficient connection to the school environment 
before the student was subjected to school discipline for it. This connec-
tion is especially important in the online school context because the loca-
tion of the speech can be ambiguous. 
Under Tinker’s “substantially disrupts” test, conduct that occurs 
online would not be regulated unless it has a substantial impact on the 
learning environment or a reasonable foreseeability of such an impact.149 
Online speech that is uncomfortable, crude, or promotes drug use (the 
speech categories that traditional schools can regulate under Fraser, 
Kuhlmeier, and Morse)150 would be appropriately protected unless it sub-
stantially disrupts the learning environment or interferes with the im-
portant mission of the school.151 
Additionally, Tinker allows courts to continue the practice of defer-
ring to local control over discipline issues in schools. The Supreme Court 
has noted, “[T]he education of the Nation’s youth is primarily the re-
sponsibility of parents, teachers, and state and local school officials, and 
not of federal judges.”152 Public school officials perform “important, del-
icate, and highly discretionary functions.”153 Therefore, by applying 
Tinker’s “substantial disruption” test to online schools, the Court pro-
vides guidance to local school officials but does not create a heavy-
handed or convoluted factor test that would complicate the work of daily 
school operations. Of course, courts remain in position to adjudicate 
challenges to the schools’ application of Tinker. However, the Court is 
notoriously removed from modern technological advances.154 Therefore, 
it is wise for the Court to defer to administrators and teachers who are 
                                                        
 148. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969). 
 149. See id. 
 150. See supra Part II. 
 151. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509. 
 152. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266–67 (1988); see also, Bd. of Educ., 
Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 864 (1982) (“[F]ederal courts should not 
ordinarily ‘intervene in the resolution of conflicts which arise in the daily operation of school sys-
tems.’” (citation omitted)). 
 153. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943). 
 154. Ashby Jones, Our Tech-Savvy Supreme Court, WSJ LAW BLOG (Apr. 19, 2010), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2010/04/19/our-tech-savvy-supreme-court/ (examples of confusion by the 
Justices about technology during oral arguments, including about the difference between email and a 
pager). Another scholar makes this argument in the Fourth Amendment search and seizure context. 
Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for 
Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801 (2004). 
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more familiar with the technology they must deal with and the “special 
characteristics”155 of the schools. 
D. Due to the Unique Nature of Online Schools, Overreach is Unlikely to 
Occur in Practice 
Allowing online schools to regulate speech without requiring a 
connection between the speech and the learning environment would be a 
tremendous First Amendment violation. Just because students have some 
limited rights at school does not mean that all of their speech is lim-
ited.156 Yet, students’ free speech rights are “not automatically coexten-
sive with the rights of adults in other settings.”157 Thus, finding an ap-
propriate balance is critical, and the fear that online students’ free speech 
rights will be significantly curtailed if schools are allowed to regulate 
comments made on non-school-sponsored websites is a legitimate one 
that must be addressed. Still, due to the unique nature of online schools, 
it is unlikely that these abstract concerns will be realized in the practical 
application of the rule. 
Requiring a connection to the learning environment is a significant 
barrier against school officials overreaching into all online students’ 
speech. Applying Tinker protects harmless comments and other state-
ments made by online students that result in mere discomfort, annoyance, 
or unpopularity. These protections are especially important for online 
students because the lines between the classroom and the home are 
blurred. Students should be protected when they make online statements 
in their homes that do not have an effect on their school environment. 
Students at online schools have much less physical interaction of the 
kind that often fuels behavior issues in traditional schools. Without the 
opportunity to be spread between students in the hallways, a comment in 
an online forum is much less likely to cause any disruption, let alone a 
substantial one, for students in an online school. A traditional student and 
an online student might say the same thing, but an online comment’s lim-
ited impact on students at the online school might keep the online student 
from being punished like the traditional student. Therefore, as this exam-
ple shows, online students do not necessarily have less free speech pro-
tections than their traditional counterparts. Even though the net may be 
wider for administrators at online schools than it is at traditional schools, 
they will only be able to catch the bigger fish. 
                                                        
 155. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 408 (2007). 
 156. See supra Part II. Students do not “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or 
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Tinker itself contains important free speech protections. The re-
quirement that speech must do more than create discomfort provides a 
key safeguard to students’ rights.158 Schools must show more than just 
the possibility of a disruption to the school; the disruption must be sub-
stantial.159 Even if schools desire to regulate speech under the reasonable 
foreseeability standard, the school would have to explain why it believed 
a substantial disruption was likely to occur. Tinker is not an arbitrary 
standard. In order to be persuasive, the school’s reasoning would include 
references to similar situations that were documented in the past. Even in 
Tinker there was the threat of disruption based on the controversy sur-
rounding the Vietnam War, but Tinker’s speech never rose to the level of 
infringing on the rights of the other students.160 Thus, the students were 
able to engage in their protest on school grounds.161 Although the school 
was concerned with the speech, the students’ rights were protected, and 
an appropriate boundary was set—a boundary that can just as easily be 
applied to the online school context. 
Another reason often given in support of stronger speech protec-
tions and a reduction of school control is that schools should not be able 
to punish speech that historically took place beyond the earshot of the 
school and thus beyond the ability to regulate.162 This argument fails in 
the context of online schools because Tinker’s substantial disruption re-
quirement prevents schools from arbitrarily punishing speech simply 
based on its content.163 A desire to avoid the unpleasantness that accom-
panies insults directed at teachers, or speech that the school simply does 
not like, is not enough.164 There needs to be more than “undifferentiated 
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fears of possible disturbances or embarrassment to school officials.”165 
The school must provide evidence to show a material and substantial in-
terference, or the reasonable foreseeability of such a disruption, with 
classwork or discipline.166 
By requiring a connection to the school environment, Tinker offers 
important protections for online students. Limiting regulation to speech 
that substantially impacts other students’ learning provides schools with 
the necessary tools to meet their duties to their students but also protects 
students from excessive regulation that has little to no impact on other 
students’ rights to learn. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Due to the dramatic increase in teen Internet use and the growing 
popularity of online schools for public high school students, the current 
student speech cases need to be updated. Much of this need—as it ap-
plies to traditional schools—is beyond the scope of this Comment. But 
any changes made to students’ Internet speech rights must address the 
unique circumstances of online schools and the challenges they face. 
Applying Tinker, without its exceptions, to online schools is an ap-
propriate balance between schools’ needs and students’ rights. Schools 
will have tools to protect other students and guard against their own fi-
nancial liabilities, while students will be protected for speech that does 
not or is not reasonably foreseeable to substantially disrupt the school 
environment for other students. As online schools change, student speech 
jurisprudence will need to continue to evolve. This Comment seeks to 
provide a starting point for that ongoing discussion. 
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